The Basra Example

Since we're discussing withdrawal, let's look at the big unknown... what will happen if we withdraw from Iraq. It's impossible to know, right? Not necessarily. The ongoing British withdrawal from southern Iraq provides an encouraging example.

From the International Herald-Tribune-

Attacks against British and Iraqi forces have plunged by 90 percent in southern Iraq since London withdrew its troops from the main city of Basra, the commander of British forces there said Thursday.

The presence of British forces in downtown Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, was the single largest instigator of violence, Maj. Gen. Graham Binns told reporters Thursday on a visit to Baghdad's Green Zone.

"We thought, 'If 90 percent of the violence is directed at us, what would happen if we stepped back?'" Binns said.

Britain's 5,000 troops moved out of a former Saddam Hussein palace at Basra's heart in early September, setting up a garrison at an airport on the city's edge. Since that pullback, there's been a "remarkable and dramatic drop in attacks," Binns said...

...British officials expected a spike in such "intra-militia violence" after they pulled back from the city's center, and were surprised to find none, Binns said...

...Last month, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that Britain will halve its remaining troop contingent in Iraq next spring — bringing the number of troops down to 2,500. The scaling back of forces has already begun, and by the year's end Britain will have 4,500 troops based mainly at Basra's airport.

Now obviously the Basra example won't translate perfectly in Baghdad and other areas, but it's clear that those who said that it's been the occupation itself playing a big role rallying people toward violence-- and that a withdrawal would help ease those tensions-- were right.

It's also important to remember those who insist otherwise are the same ones falsely declaring success now in Iraq. Furthermore, those predicting chaos and worldwide terror if we (ever) leave-- mostly by reminiscing about what happened in Vietnam following our exit, a product more of inevitability and years of bad policy than of American weakness-- are the same ones who predicted the war would a six-week cakewalk, that we'd be greeted as liberators, that democracy would flower across the Middle East, etc.

With war supporters now talking of "best case scenarios" involving "the US keep[ing] 80,000-100,000 troops in Iraq for the next twenty to thirty years," we need to realize the time for withdrawal is now. Johnson administration officials would later admit they knew their war was hopeless by 1967. Yet it went on for another 6-8 years, anyway. There's a lesson in there-- and in Basra-- if anyone cares to learn it.